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INCOME TAX VALIDITY OF INVALID MIGRATORY
DIVORCES AND "THE RULE OF VALIDATION"
I. INTRODUCTION
A taxpayer's marital status is relevant in determining, among other
things, whether a joint return may be filed,' an alimony deduction taken,2
or certain dependency deductions claimed, 3 as well as whether alimony must
be reported as income.4 Federal courts, for the most part, have uniformly
1. INT. Rev. COD9 Or 1954, § 6013, provides in part:
(a) Joint returns
A husband and wife may make a single return jointly of income taxes . . .
even though one of the spouses has neither gross income nor deductions ....
(d) Definitions
For the purposes of this section-
(2) an individual who is legally separated from his spouse under a decree
of divorce or of separate maintenance shall not be considered as married....
2. INT. Rnv. COD9 OF 1954, § 215 provides in part:
(a) General Rule - In the case of a husband described in section 71 [see infra
note 4], there shall be allowed as a deduction amounts includible under sec-
tion 71 in the gross income of his wife....
3. INT. REv. CODe Ol 1954, §§ 151-54. Subject to certain qualifications, § 151 (b)
allows a taxpayer a $600 exemption for his or her spouse. Subject also to certain
qualifications, § 151 (e) allows a $600 exemption for each of taxpayer's dependents as
defined in § 152; under the latter section, an individual whose principal place of abode
is not in the taxpayer's home may not qualify as a dependent (§ 152(a) (9)), unless
the individual is related to the taxpayer by blood, marriage or adoption within the
degrees specified by § 152(a), (1)-(8).
Section 153, titled "Determination of Marital Status," provides in part:
For the purposes of this part-
(2) An individual legally separated from his spouse under a decree of divorce
or of separate maintenance shall not be considered as married.
Whether an individual qualifies as a taxpayer's spouse or dependent also deter-
mines the deductability of certain expenses incurred by the taxpayer on another's
behalf. E.g., § 213 (Medical, Dental, Etc., Expense) and § 214 (Expenses For Child
Care of Certain Dependents).
4. INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 71, provides in part:
(a) General Rule
(1) Decree of divorce or separate maintenance - If a wife is divorced or
legally separated from her husband under a decree of divorce or of a
separate maintenance, the wife's gross income includes periodic pay-
ments . . . received after such degree in discharge of . . . a legal obligation
which, because of the marital or family relationship, is imposed on or
incurred by the husband under the decree or under a written instrument
incident to such divorce or separation.
(2) Written separation agreement - If a wife is separated from her husband
and there is a written separation agreement executed after the date of
the enactment of this title, the wife's gross income includes periodic
payments . . . received after such agreement is executed which are made
under such agreement and because of the marital or family relation-
ship .... (Emphasis added.)
Before 1954, payments were deductible by the husband and taxable to the wife
only if they were divorced or legally separated under a decree of divorce or of separate
maintenance; an out of court separation agreement was insufficient. See INT. Rnv.
COOS OF 1939, §§ 22(k) and 23(u). In 1954, § 71(a) (2) was enacted to permit pay-
ments under a written separation agreement to qualify as alimony even though there
was no decree of divorce or separate maintenance. However, § 71(a) (2) applies only
to agreements executed after the 1954 code was enacted.
Section 682 of the 1954 code, relating to alimony trusts, contains provisions similar
to §§ 71 and 215, supra note 3.
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held that a taxpayer's marital status under local law fixes his marital status
for tax purposes. 5 There has been no such unanimity, however, with regard
to decisions involving a taxpayer who obtained a divorce that was invalid
under the law of his domicile. Some courts have held that local law con-
trols in this situation as in others,6 while other courts have held that a
taxpayer's marital status under local law does not necessarily determine his
marital status for tax purposes. 7
II. CONFLICTING POSITIONS
American jurisdictions have uniformly refused to recognize ex parte
divorces granted by other jurisdictions where the jurisdictional requisite of
domicile has been missing.8 Such decisions not only give rise to complica-
tions under state law, but also create certain federal income tax problems.
For example, suppose H and W-1, New York domicilaries, had executed a
separation agreement prior to 19549 which provided that H would pay cer-
tain designated sums periodically for W-l's support, that H then obtained
an ex parte Mexican divorce, married W-2 and lived with her in New York.
Soon after the divorce and remarriage, W-1 obtained an order from a New
York court declaring that H's Mexican divorce was invalid and that W-1
and not W-2 was H's lawful wife. May H thereafter claim a deduction
for the support payments made to W-1 ? May he file a joint return with
W-2 and claim her, her parents and her children by a former marriage
as dependents ?10 In a recent Second Circuit decision involving an identical
factual situation,' it was held that the husband is allowed an alimony de-
duction, and that he may file a joint return with his second wife and take
dependency deductions for her, her parents and her children. The majority
applied what it termed a "rule of validation" under which a subsequent
decree of invalidity by a court other than the one rendering the divorce
has no effect for tax purposes. It found justification for disregarding the
parties' status under local law in the need for certainty and uniformity
in the federal tax scheme.
5. E.g., Sullivan v. Commissioner, 256 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Commissioner
v. Ostler, 237 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Commissioner v. Evans, 211 F.2d 378 (10th
Cir. 1954) ; M. Garsaud, 28 T.C. 1086 (1957).
6. See decisions cited infra note 21 and Gersten v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 195
(9th Cir. 1959), discussed infra.
7. See Wondsel v. Commissioner, 350 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Estate of Borax
v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Feinberg v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d
260 (3d Cir. 1952), and discussion infra.
8. 27B C.J.S., Divorce § 348 (1959).
9. Unless the parties are divorced or separated under a decree of divorce or
separate maintenance, payments made by a husband to a wife under a separation agree-
ment executed prior to 1954 are neither deductible by the husband nor taxable to the
wife. See INT. Rtv. CODE OF 1939, §§ 22(k) and 23(u) and note 4 supra.
10. If H is not "divorced" from W-1, he cannot claim an alimony deduction for
payments made to her under the support agreement. See supra notes 3 and 4. Simi-
larly, if H is not "married" to W-2, he cannot file a joint return with her, see supra
note 1, and H's right to claim W-2, her parents and her children as dependents may
also be adversely affected if H and W-2 are not "married." See supra note 2.
11. Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965). Judge
Friendly dissented.
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In conflict with the Second Circuit's disregard of the taxpayer's marital
status under the law of his domicile in Borax, is the Ninth Circuit's reliance
upon the law of the domicile in Gersten v. Commissioner.12 In that case,
the first wife obtained a California interlocutory divorce decree which
is not final under California law until one year after it is rendered.' 3 Seven
months after the first wife obtained the decree, the husband obtained a
Mexican divorce and remarried. The court held that the second marriage
was a nullity for tax purposes and that the husband could not file a joint
return with his second wife. The court reasoned that the second marriage
was invalid since under California law, the law of the domicile of the par-
ties involved, a marriage of either party during the life of the other is void
if contracted within one year of the entry of an interlocutory divorce decree. 14
The majority in Borax attempted to distinguish Gersten by argu-
ing that:
Gersten v. Commissioner . . . did not involve a state court judg-
ment declaring the second marriage invalid because of the invalidity of
the divorce from the first marriage. Instead, it involved a state pro-
hibition against remarrying that operated independently of whether the
divorce obtained in a foreign jurisdiction was valid .... In contrast, in
the instant case the claimed invalidity of the second marriage is
entirely derived from the invalidity of the divorce of the first marriage.
We found it consonant with the tax purposes to recognize this divorce,
and hence the underpinings of not recognizing the second marriage
are removed.' 5
The two decisions, however, are basically inconsistent. In Gersten,
the court relied on specific provisions of the law of the taxpayer's domicile, 16
while in Borax, the taxpayer's marital status under the law of his domicile
was disregarded. Moreover, whether a second marriage is invalid in the
domiciliary state because it is specifically prohibited by that state (Gersten),
or whether a second marriage is invalid in the domiciliary state because
that state does not permit the type of divorce obtained from the first mar-
riage (Borax), the result is the same - in both situations the second mar-
riage is invalid under local law.' 7 Consequently, when a federal court is pre-
sented with either situation, it must decide whether the taxpayer's marital
status under the law of his domicile fixes his marital status for tax purposes.
In Wondsel v. Commissioner,i s the Second Circuit applied its "rule
of validation" to a Florida divorce decree subsequently declared invalid in
New York. In accord with the result reached in that case is the Third
12. 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959).
13. Id. at 199-200, citing CAL. CIVIL CODE § 132.
14. Commissioner v. Gersten, 267 F.2d 195, 199-200 (9th Cir. 1959) (citing CAL.
CIVIL CODE § 61(1)).
15. Supra note 11, at 675-76.
16. See supra notes 13 and 14, and accompanying text.
17. Judge Friendly, who dissented in Borax, also rejected the majority's distinc-
tion in Gersten. Supra note 11, at 677.
18. 350 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1965).
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Circuit's decision in Feinberg v. Commissioner0 which also held valid
for tax purposes a Florida divorce decree declared invalid in New York.
The Feinberg court, however, did not expressly enunciate any general
rule of validation, but supported its decision by relying on the position
taken by the Treasury Department in General Counsel's Memo. 25250.20
If the parties had relied in good faith upon the validity of the Florida decree,
it was to be recognized for tax purposes, even though it was probably
invalid under the law of the parties' domicile.
Two interpretations of the Feinberg decision are possible. The court's
reliance on the Treasury regulation may mean that the court adheres to
the position that the taxpayer's good faith reliance on the decree is determi-
native. On the other hand, it is possible to read the Feinberg decision
as supporting a rule of validation similar to that announced by the Second
Circuit. The foreign divorce decree, while probably invalid in the parties'
domicile, had not actually been declared invalid by the regulation relied
upon in Feinberg; yet the foreign divorce decree in Feinberg, like the
decrees in Borax and Wondsel, had been declared invalid by a court of
the parties' domicile.
In opposition to the Second Circuit's "rule of validation" is the Tax
Court's adherance to a "local law theory." In a long line of decisions in-
volving migratory divorces invalid in a taxpayer's domicile, the Tax Court
has held that the law of the taxpayer's domicile determines his marital
status for tax purposes .21
The Treasury Department's position is set forth in General Counsel's
Memo. 2525022 and Revenue Ruling 57-113.23 As stated above, the tax-
payer's good faith reliance on the questionable divorce is controlling. In
the factual situation presented by General Counsel's Memo. 25250, the tax-
payer and his first wife, Connecticut domiciliaries, had executed a separation
agreement providing for the wife's support. The wife had then obtained
a Mexican divorce and the taxpayer remarried, continuing to pay his first
wife in accordance with the separation agreement until she was advised by
counsel that the Mexican divorce would not be recognized in Connecticut.
The husband claimed a deduction for payments made under the separation
agreement relying upon the Mexican divorce,2 4 a question was therefore
raised with regard to whether the Mexican decree should be recognized
for tax purposes. Acknowledging that the Mexican decree would probably
not be recognized in Connecticut, but finding that both parties acted in good
faith in relying upon the decree, the memorandum stated:
19. 198 F.2d 260 (3d Cir. 1952).
20. 1947-2 CuM. BULL. 32. See discussion infra.
21. E.g., Ruth Borax, 40 T.C. 1001 (1963), rev'd sub norn. Estate of Borax v.
Commissioner, supra note 11; J. J. Untermann, 38 T.C. 93 (1962) ; Albert Gersten,
28 T.C. 756 (1957), aff'd on this issue, 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959).
22. Supra note 20.
23. 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 106.
24. See supra note 9.
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There is no doubt that many persons affected by Mexican decrees
have acted in good faith in relying on such divorces. . . . To allow
deductions . . . in such cases seems to be within the general intent
of Congress ....
Since the parties in the instant case took affirmative steps which
clearly indicate their reliance on the validity of the Mexican decree,
and since the facts negative any effort on their part to use such decree
as a device to avoid or evade taxes, . . . the monthly payments by the
husband to his wife.., are deductable .... 25 (Emphasis added.)
The limits of the Treasury's position are set out in Revenue Ruling
57-113. There, soon after the husband had obtained a Mexican divorce and
remarried, his first wife instituted an action in the state of her domicile
contesting the validity of the Mexican divorce and asking for a separation
and an allowance pendente lite. The state court granted the wife the allow-
ance and the husband made the payments. The question presented was
whether these payments otherwise deductible under section 21526 (because
taxable to the wife under section 71 (a) (3)),27 were rendered nondeductible
because of the Mexican divorce. The Treasury Department, in ruling that
the payments were deductible, stated:
In G.C.M. 25250... payments made under an agreement incident
to a Mexican divorce decree . . . were held deductible. Payments
made in good faith incident to a Mexican decree or other decree, the
validity of which has been questioned, are generally includible in the
wife's gross income ... and deductible by the husband .... This does
not mean that payments made under a later decree which does not
recognize the earlier decree are not to be similarly treated. The position
taken by the service in G.C.M. 25250, supra, was not intended to
recognize the Mexican decree over subsequent decrees of other juris-
dictions. (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, it is held that the existence of a Mexican divorce
decree prior to a decree granted in a state which does not recognize
the validity of the Mexican divorce does not preclude the deductibility
of the pendente lite payments made pursuant to the state decree. 28
(Emphasis added.)
By stating that prior questionable decrees will not be recognized "over
subsequent decrees in other jurisdictions," the ruling implies that if a later
state court decree declares a prior decree of another jurisdiction to be void,
the Treasury will not give the prior decree tax effect.29 This was the posi-
25. Supra note 20, at 33.
26. See supra note 3.
27. INT. Rev. CoDg of 1954, § 71 (a) (3). Under this section, a wife separated from
her husband must include in her gross income support payments received by her from
her husband under a decree requiring the husband to make the payments. The pay-
ments in the above ruling did not fall under § 71(a) (1) or § 71(a) (2), supra note 4,
since they were neither imposed nor incurred by the husband under a decree of divorce
or separate maintenance nor were they made under a separation agreement.
28. Supra note 23, at 107.
29. See Garelik, Some Further Questions In The Taxation of Alimony and ChildSupport Payments, 30 BROOKLYN L. Rev. 26, 42-43 (1963).
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tion taken by the Commissioner in Feinberg, Borax and Wondsel. The
Treasury Department will therefore recognize a questionable divorce if a
taxpayer relies in good faith upon its validity and if it has not been declared
invalid by a court of the taxpayer's domicile. If, however, the divorce has
been declared invalid, it will not be recognized for tax purposes.
III. TuE RULE OF VALIDATION - ITS SCOPE AND PROBLEMS
Borax and Wondsel decided only that a divorce declared invalid by a
jurisdiction other than the one rendering it is valid for tax purposes and
left open questions as to the applicability of the "rule of validation" to
certain related but distinct situations. One such question is whether the
rule of validation applies where a foreign divorce has not been formally
declared invalid in the taxpayer's domicile, but prior decisions of the
domicile indicate that the divorce is invalid there. It would seem that such
a situation presents an even stronger case for application of the rule of
validation than did Borax and Wondsel, since in those cases the domiciliary
state had actually adjudged the foreign divorce invalid. Moreover, non-
application of the rule in this situation would involve a federal court in the
resolution of questions under the domicile state's domestic relations law -
the type of involvement the rule of validation was- apparently designed
to avoid.30
It would seem, however, that the rule of validation would not apply
where the rendering jurisdiction itself declares the divorce invalid. Non-
application of the rule in this situation would not involve a federal court
in questions as to the validity of a divorce under state law in as much as
a state court would have already adjudged the divorce invalid. On the
other hand, application of the rule in this situation would be inconsistent
with the Internal Revenue Code's requirement that there be a "legal obli-
gation"3 1 to make payments to a former spouse; if the rendering jurisdic-
tion itself declares the divorce invalid, the divorce would be without legal
effect anywhere and no "legal obligation" could therefore exist. There is
dicta in both the Borax and the Wondsel opinions to the effect that the
rule of validation would not apply to such a situation. In Borax, the
majority stated that it was "possible" that there was a distinction between
the situation before it and the situation where the rendering jurisdiction
itself declares the divorce invalid, 2 while in Wondsel, the court stated that,
as the Florida divorce in issue had not been declared invalid by the Florida
courts, the Borax decision had the effect of validating it for tax purposes.33
The conclusion that the rule of validation would not be applicable to
the situation where a divorce has been overturned by the rendering jurisdic-
30. See Estate of Borax v. Commissioner, supra note 11, at 670 and 676 (Friendly,
J., dissenting).
31. INT. Rtv. CODF OF 1954, § 71(a) (1), supra note 4.
32. Supra note 11, at 672.
33. Supra note 18, at 341.
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tion, prompts another question undecided by Borax and Wondsel. Would
the rule apply where the divorce has not been declared invalid by the ren-
dering jurisdiction but where it would probably do so if litigated, because,
for one reason or another, the divorce should not have been originally
granted? It is likely that the rule would apply to such a situation and that
the divorce would be valid for tax purposes, since non-application of the
rule would involve a federal court in the resolution of questions of state
domestic relations law. Application of the rule in this situation, however,
would meet the same objection as its application where the rendering juris-
diction has actually declared the divorce invalid; if the divorce is void in
the rendering jurisdiction, it would have no legal effect anywhere, and
no "legal obligation" could therefore exist.
The majority in Borax did answer one question as to the scope of its
rule of validation:
[W]e are not dealing with a situation where the rendering jurisdic-
tions' concept of divorce is totally alien to that contemplated by the
tax laws. The test would not be whether the divorce would be declared
invalid in every state, but rather whether the divorce frustrated the
revenue purposes of the tax laws .... 34 (Emphasis added.)
The rule of validation will, therefore, not give tax validity to every ques-
tionable divorce, nor will the validity of a divorce for tax purposes be deter-
mined by standards set by the domestic relations laws of the states. Ques-
tions as to a divorce's tax validity are to be resolved with reference to the
revenue purposes of the tax law itself. The court did not define, however,
precisely what it meant by "a divorce that frustrated the revenue purposes
of the tax laws." If a divorce obtained solely to gain some tax advantage
falls within this category, as certainly would be the case, the court's "test"
is susceptible to two possible extremes: A divorce that meets the standards
of every state, may nevertheless be invalid for tax purposes, if it was
obtained solely to gain some tax advantage; conversely, a divorce that
fails to meet the standards of any state (e.g., a Mexican "mail order"
divorce)31 may be given tax effect if it was not obtained solely to gain a
tax advantage.
The requirements of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution6
could pose a problem in the application of the rule of validation. While it
is settled that one state may refuse to give full faith and credit to an ex
parte divorce decree rendered by another state if it finds that the rendering
state lacked jurisdiction,3 7 it is not settled that the rendering jurisdiction
34. Supra note 11, at 672.
35. A Mexican "mail order" divorce is one in which a party, without ever becom-ing a resident of Mexico, corresponds with an attorney who prepares the necessary
papers which the party signs. A Mexican decree is then obtained without the party
being present in Mexico. 24 AM. JUR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 965, n.7 (1966).
It has generally been held in United States jurisdictions that such divorces are abso-
lutely void and will not be recognized by comity. Supra at § 965.
36. U.S. CoNsTr. art. IV, § 1.
37. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
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must give full faith and credit to such a finding. 8 Accordingly, in a factual
situation similar to that of the Wondsel case - i.e., where one United States
jurisdiction declares a divorce granted by another jurisdiction invalid -
the full faith and credit clause may or may not require that the declaration
of invalidity be recognized by the jurisdiction granting the divorce. If
full faith and credit does not require that the rendering jurisdiction recog-
nize another jurisdiction's declaration of invalidity, application of the rule
of validation would not be inconsistent with the Internal Revenue Code's
requirement that a "legal obligation" exist, since the divorce, though invalid
in the domicile, is still valid in the rendering jurisdiction. But if full faith
and credit does require the rendering jurisdiction to recognize another
jurisdiction's declaration of invalidity, the divorce is neither valid in the
domicile state nor in the rendering state, and application of the rule of
validation again produces the result that a divorce valid nowhere is valid
for tax purposes.
IV. THE RULE OF VALIDATION - AN EVALUATION
The Second Circuit's rule of validation was advanced in an attempt to
promote certainty and uniformity in the Federal tax scheme.8 9 The rule
itself does promote uniformity by employing one federal standard in deter-
mining a taxpayer's marital status rather than the diverse domestic rela-
tions laws of some fifty jurisdictions. Also, a large degree of certainty will
be promoted by the rule if it is applied so as to give tax validity to all
divorces, except where the rendering jurisdiction has itself adjudged a
divorce invalid. The court's statement in Borax on the other hand, that
the rule of validation is not applicable to a divorce that "frustrates the
revenue purposes of the tax laws" is certainly not conducive to certainty
inasmuch as a divorce will always be open to attack for this reason. This
type of uncertainty, however, pervades the tax law generally; many trans-
actions that meet the formal requirements of other rules of law are open
to attack by the Commissioner since questions are decided by examining
the practical and substantial aspects of a transaction rather than its formal
or legal effect.40 It therefore should not be surprising that a divorce which
38. See, e.g., Colby v. Colby, 78 Nev. 150, 369 P.2d 1019, cert. denied, 371 U.S.
888 (1962), holding that the rendering jurisdiction is not required to give full faith
and credit to another jurisdiction's finding that the rendering state lacked jurisdiction.
Conflicting answers to this question have been given in dicta by several Supreme Court
Justices. Mr. Justice Reed indicated in Sutton v. Lieb, 342 U.S. 402, 408 (1952), that
the rendering jurisdiction must recognize a subsequent declaration of invalidity by
another state, while in Williams v. North Carolina, supra note 37, Mr. Justice Murphy,
concurring, id. at 239, and Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting, id. at 244, indicated that
a divorce might still be valid in the rendering jurisdiction, even though later invalidated
for lack of jurisdiction by a court of another state.
39. The majority in Borax also justified the rule as tending to further the "indi-
cated congressional policy of placing the tax burden of all general marriage settlement
payments on the party entitled to their enjoyment." Supra note 11, at 670.
40. E.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960) ; Commissioner v. Hansen,
360 U.S. 446 (1959) ; Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) ;
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) ; Bridges v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 180(4th Cir. 1963) ; Estate of Delano T. Starr v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir.
1959) ; Brown v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1958).
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meets all the requirements of state law may be denied tax effect if it is
merely a device to avoid or evade taxes.
Moreover, the other views as to when a divorce should be given tax
effect also lack this element of certainty. The Treasury Department's
requirement that the taxpayer must in good faith rely on the validity of the
questionable divorce also leaves a divorce open to attack as a tax avoidance
device.41 Similarly, it would seem that courts taking the "local law"
approach would also look at substance and not form and deny a divorce
tax effect, even though valid in the taxpayer's domicile, if it were employed
merely as a tax avoidance device.42
As noted previously, a more basic criticism of the "rule of validation,"
is that its application in certain instances may result in holding a divorce
valid for tax purposes that is invalid everywhere. It is possible, however,
for the same result to be reached under the other views. For example,
in the situation where the jurisdiction of the taxpayer's domicile has not
declared a divorce rendered by another jurisdiction invalid, but would
probably do so if litigated, the Treasury would give the questionable divorce
tax validity if the parties in good faith relied upon it.4  The effect of such
a ruling could be to hold a divorce, valid nowhere, valid for tax purposes
if the rendering jurisdiction would have to give full faith and credit to a
declaration of nullity rendered by the jurisdiction of the taxpayer's domicile.
A similar result would be reached in this situation if a court adhering
to the "local law" theory gave a questionable divorce income tax validity.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether questions as to the income tax validity of a questionable
migratory divorce are resolved by reference to the taxpayer's marital status
in the state of his domicile, by a rule that makes reliance upon the divorce
determinative, or by a "rule of validation," it is entirely possible that a
divorce valid nowhere will be valid for tax purposes, unless Federal courts
deciding tax questions also involve themselves in abstract questions of full
faith and credit. It would seem the "lesser evil" is to permit the somewhat
anomolous result 'that, in certain instances, a divorce valid nowhere will
be valid for tax purposes. Since such a result is unavoidable under any of
the theories advanced, resolution of questions concerning a taxpayer's
marital status through the use of the Second Circuits "rule of validation" is
preferable, since it is capable of being uniformly applied in all jurisdictions.
Thomas I. Tumola
41. See Chief Counsel's Memo. 25250, quoted supra, implying that the divorce in
issue there would not have been recognized for tax purposes if the parties had used
the decree "as a device to avoid or evade taxes."
42. Cf., J. H. Bridges, 39 T.C. 1064 (1963), aff'd, 325 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963).
43. Chief Counsel's Memo. 25250, supra note 20.
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